Developments in Philosophy
With an appreciation for ancient philosophy and the way it set the trajectory for the next millennia, there have been some remarkable developments within logic and metaphysics since then, especially beginning in the late nineteenth and early 20th century. That point will likely strike the historian of philosophy as completely obvious, but many theologians are still hung up on using ancient terms and concepts when they discuss logic or metaphysics.
On logic, Ted Sider in his book Logic for Philosophy (i) says:
For better or for worse (I think better), the last century-or-so’s developments in logic are part of the shared knowledge base of philosophers, and inform nearly every area of philosophy. Logic is part of our shared language and inheritance. The standard philosophy curriculum therefore includes a healthy dose of logic. This is a good thing.
Not only were 20th century developments in logic (through Frege, Russell, Gödel, set theory, modal logic, etc.) a giant leap forward from previous generations, they inform nearly every area of philosophy. Which means that discussion of any philosophical topic (or theological topic that assumes such ideas or terminology) should at least be aware of such developments.
Or in the field of metaphysics, David Armstrong in Universals (29):
Philosophy has been a long time coming to grips with the category of relation. Aristotle said of relations that they were “least of all things a kind of entity or substance” (Metaphysics 1088 a22). The tradition has tended to echo this ever since. The categories of substance (thing) and attribute (property) are long established, but not so the category of relation. It is not until the late nineteenth and the twentieth century with C.S. Pierce, William James, and Bertrand Russell that relations begin (no more than begin) to come into focus.
Contra Aristotle, taking relations seriously, especially in set theory and related topics, has helped us think through ideas and to get more complete and precise within the field of metaphysics. In whatever way a particular theologian or school of theology has used philosophical concepts found in logic or metaphysics, you would think a reasonable awareness of the developments within each field is a given. But more often than not, that turns out not to be true.
